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ABSTRACT 
 
 
For over a decade the healthcare industry has attempted to mimic the non-medical industry with 
the use of incident reporting as one of many tools used to increase patient safety. But often 
healthcare workers are trained to perfect individual performance and the incident reporting 
descriptions are frequently weighted with character flaws (Leape, 1997). Human error is viewed 
as a personal failure instead of a natural course of systemic contribution. This qualitative case 
study explores how the healthcare systems’ approach to human error can influence the nurses’ 
perception of human error and how this influence is manifested in the incident reporting culture. 
This study also encompasses the nurse manager’s view of human error as he/she manages the 
nurses who self-report or report their peers. And lastly, the just culture concept is discussed as it 
intertwines  with the complexity of  incident reporting. Two approaches to human error from 
safety science literature, the ‘Old View’ vs. ‘New View’ approaches, are used as a guide to portray 
the possible differences the two approaches institute themselves in the nurses’ understanding of 
human error. Five registered nurses and three nurse managers were interviewed to explore their 
depth of knowledge of human error as it establishes into the writing or not writing of incident 
reports. Key healthcare organizational documents and state laws were analyzed to examine the 
healthcare systems’ approach to human error and incident reporting and their possible influence 
on nurses’ perception of human error. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of incidents in high-risk industries has been an avenue for organizations to learn from 
weakness and potential hazards in safety. Effective safety systems in high-risk industry, such as 
chemical processing, offshore oil exploration, nuclear power, and aviation, often use voluntary 
incident reporting as a tool for safety management (Barach & Small, 2000; Benn, et al., 2009; 
Wald & Shojania, 2010). Incident reporting represents an opportunity for professional and 
organizational learning. It helps to keep managers and the blunt-end of organization highly 
sensitive about work environment and its constraints (Woods, et al., 2010).  
 
In the healthcare system, incident reports are usually based on the self-reporting of front-line staff 
to offer information regarding an adverse event or a ‘near miss’ that occur within routine work 
situations (Benn, et al., 2009). Nurses, for example, are often at the sharp-end of a long string of 
participation from other providers and processes, such as pharmacists, physicians, radiologists, 
techs and other professionals. Incident reporting in nursing literature suggests that many systemic 
factors are involved when errors occurs. For instance, inadequate training, environmental 
distractions, and staff communication (see Gladstone, 1995; Walker & Lowe, 1998) are listed as 
systemic factors. Researchers also suggest that these several categories of errors are often out of the 
individual’s control (see Leape, 1997). 
 
Learning in healthcare safety strongly depends on trust and transparency for incident reporting 
(Leape et al., 2009). Since human error is frequently in the crosshairs of incident reports, 
previous studies have stressed the necessity of a just culture environment to provide the adequate 
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support for reporting (Dekker, 2007; Reason, 1997). In this sense, understanding the approach 
to human error in healthcare – whether it is assumed that errors are causes of incidents or 
symptoms of deeper problems in the system – gives us insights to comprehend the cultural view 
of incident reporting (Dekker, 2002, 2006; Woods & Cook, 2002). The first approach very 
often called, the ‘first story’ or “Old View” (OV), while the second approach is called the ‘second 
story’ or the “New View” (NV).  
 
Nursing literature has discussed a variety of elements associated with incident reporting and the 
reasons why nurses do not report. Such reasons are very often mentioned to be the fear of 
consequences (Chiang, Lin, Hsu & Ma, 2010; Wakefield, et al., 1999), the perceptions of the 
overall organization culture (Throckmorton & Etchegaray, 2007), and ‘self-preservation’ (Walker 
& Lowe, 1998). Much of these reasons might actually be connected to the way human error is 
approached in healthcare systems and how organizations, especially nurse managers deal with 
incident reporting. A positive response from nurse managers can create support and focus on 
learning outcomes; negative responses can lead to losing professional respect, treating unfairly, 
and scapegoating (Wakefield et al., 1999).  
 
In this study, we are explaining how the approach to human error in healthcare system guides the 
nurses’ view of incident reporting. We focus on the nurses’ understanding of human error and 
what role this understanding plays in the writing or not writing of an incident report. The study 
also encompasses the nurse manager’s view of human error as he/she manages the nurses who 
have to self-report or report on their peers. And lastly, how the component of just culture fits 
into the realm of incident reporting and the understanding of ‘human error’.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Human error  
 
A significant goal in the report of To Err in Human: Building a safer system  (Kohn, Corrigan, 
Donaldson, McKay, and Pike, 2000) was to decrease blame of the caregiver and find another 
approach to human error, one in which the systemic components play a role in the caregiver’s 
socio-technical view. To see “error” with some value instead of an erroneous act could change the 
course of the way the human component is viewed within the healthcare system (Cook & 
Nemeth, 2010). But finding a newer approach, one that did not place blame in today’s 
healthcare system has been difficult. McIntyre and Popper (as cited in Leape, 1997) state, “the 
blaming approach to medical error creates strong pressure on individuals to cover up mistakes 
and even if punishment is not overt, colleagues will be regarded as incompetent” (p. 214).  
Taking a look at the two approaches to human error is significant in understanding the 
differences in how the approach of human error plays out within a system.  
 
The old view approach to human error 
 
To start we will look at the “Old View”(OV) approach of human error.  The OV approach 
believes that erratic people degrade an otherwise safe system. Dekker, (2006) suggests, this view 
trusts complex systems are basically safe, humans are unreliable, and who undermine defenses, 
rules and regulations. And to make the system safe again, restrictions need to be tighter (Preface 
xi).  The OV or what Woods and Cook (2002) call the  “’first story’, explains that this approach 
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is based on ‘outcome’ and is overly simplified accounts for the apparent ‘cause’ of the undesired 
outcome” (p. 137). This view believes that humans are inherently unreliable and the greatest 
threat to a basically safe system (Dekker, 2002).  
 
Looking at the OV, Dekker (2006) states, “ ‘Bad Apples’ or ‘bad people’ have negative attitudes 
toward safety, which adversely affects their behavior and systems are basically safe with carefully 
constructed policies and procedures which are undermined by erratic people” (p. 2). Woods and 
Cook (2002) found “if one were to look back into a story, hindsight bias could narrow and 
distort ones view of practice to a type of ‘after-the-fact’ mentality” (p. 137).  The confidence in 
the OV approach is that through selection, proceduralization, automation, training and discipline 
progress in safety can be made by protecting these systems from unreliable humans (Dekker, 
2002). And as Woods, et al., (2010) claim, “human error in the ‘old view’, is not well defined 
and attributing error to the actions of some person, team or organization is a social and 
psychological process, not an objective and technical one” (Preface). In conclusion, Dekker 
(2006) suggests, to the OV, “human error is the cause of a mishap such as a violation, regulatory 
shortcoming, and managerial deficiencies. And someone must find these inaccurate judgments, 
and the wrong decisions” (Preface xiv).  
 
The new view approach to human error 
 
The “New View”(NV) is that people create safety at all levels of the social-technical system by 
learning and adapting to information about how we can all contribute to success and failure 
(Woods, et al., 2010). And Dekker (2006) stated, “human error is not the cause of failure but a 
symptom of deeper trouble, It is not random but systematically connected to features of people’s 
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tools, tasks and operating environment and it is not the conclusion of an investigation but the 
starting point” (p.15). Woods, et al. (2010) “indicates the story behind ‘human error’ is markedly 
complex” (p.5). Examples of this complexity state the incident usually is contextual, involving 
technology interface creating new forms of error, and most error involves interactions of others. 
The NV or the ‘second story’ approach by Woods and Cook (2002) believe to understand error 
is to, 
 “ look underneath the surface to discover multiple contributors to error, escape hindsight 
bias, understand work at the sharp-end, search for systemic vulnerabilities, underlying 
patterns, examine how change will produce new vulnerabilities, use of technology to 
support human expertise and tame complexity through new forms of feedback”, (p. 137).   
 
In conclusion to the NV approach is that “it is insightful within complex systems and the sources 
of error are structural, not personal, and error and accidents are only remotely related, not a result 
of a breakdown of a well functioning system” (Dekker, 2006, p. 17). 
 
Incident reporting and to human error in the healthcare system 
 
A few studies have previously explored incident reporting. Barach and Small (2000), for example, 
used a literature search to discuss lessons learned from non-medical near miss incident reporting 
systems and how a balance of incentives over barriers can help manage incident reporting. Leape 
(1997) explains a variety of methods to be used for a more systemic approach to error in 
healthcare, one being a non-punitive approach to incident reporting joined with a trusting 
culture to increase an affective safety program.  This study is followed by four research studies 
particularly related to medication incident reporting from 1995- 2010 (see Chiang, Lin Hsu & 
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Ma, 2010; Gladstone, 1995; Wakefield et al., 1999; Walker & Lowe, 1998). Along side theses 
studies is a study on factors affecting incident reporting among registered nurses (Throckmorton 
& Etchegaray, 2007) and lastly, a study related to the nurses response to errors and how they 
cope with errors in a system which is supportive in comparison to a non-supportive system 
(Karga, Kiekkas, Aretha & Lemonidou, 2011).  
 
These studies appear to elaborate about the approach to human error within the healthcare 
system. For example, Gladstone, (1995) states that in the hospital setting there are many 
individuals along the path of medication delivery and administration but often it is the nurse who 
is held accountable for errors and it consequences. Chiang, Lin, Hsu and Ma, (2010) reveal their 
findings suggested, “the nurses’ attitude, judgments toward reporting self and co-worker were 
major deterrents. These attitudes were imperative to learn from error and improving safety” 
(p.24). The understanding of what human error is and why an error occurred is often mirrored in 
the act of an incident report. The barriers to which the nurses have to overcome reflect the 
complexity of self-reporting. Some significant barriers brought out in these studies are 
understanding what constituted an error (Gladstone, 1995; Wakefield, et al. 1999), the belief the 
nurse would be reprimanded, fear of peer confidence, manager reaction, and patient harm 
(Gladstone, 1995; Hewitt, 2010; Wakefield, et. al, 1999; Walker & Lowe, 1998) And as 
Gladstone (1995) discusses, nurse managers are often guided by their own approach to error, 
although they desire a more uniform approach and would glean from education, it is often 
replicated in their responses.  
 
Looking at a few lessons learned on near miss incident reporting from non-medical systems, 
Barach and Small (2000) write an analysis through a literature search to identify incident 
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reporting systems. Using multiple databases from 1966-99 they reviewed relevant journals, 
abstracts, dissertations, theses, and book chapters.  Using this as a basis they identified directors 
and designers for semi-structured interviews. Identifying 25 non-medical incident reporting 
systems, in which they reviewed twelve from aviation, nuclear engineering, petrochemical 
processing, and NASA. Seven of the twelve were implemented by the federal government and 
had voluntary participation. Ten systems were confidential and two anonymous. Some offered 
legal immunity to reporters as long as data was submitted quickly. The aim of the study was to 
provide a resource about near miss incident reporting systems and lessons on safety that could 
possibly transferable to healthcare. The authors found each system had barriers and incentives for 
reporting which encompassed the individual, the organization and society. Looking at the 
individual barriers, there was fear of reprisals and lack of trust but when an incentive was 
provided such as confidentiality and immunity the reporting was better utilized. They concluded, 
“healthcare reporting systems must provide incentives to promote voluntary reporting, 
completely confidential and objective” (p.763). 
 
 How to transform healthcare’s current blame and resistance to one of learning and safety is to 
understand the balance of barriers and incentive to reporting and introduce a normalcy of 
learning, in non-punitive safety reporting cultures we will turn to Leape (1997). Leape (1997) 
uses the extensive examination by a quantitative Harvard Medical Practice Study reviewing 
iatrogenic (medical) injury in New York patients in 1984 in his article, A system analysis 
approach to medical error. The discovery of the Harvard study revealed, “approximately 4% of 
patients suffered an injury that prolonged their hospital stay or resulted in a measurable disability. 
This equaled to 98, 609 patients in 1984” (Leape, 1997, pp. 213-4). Leape discusses “cognitive 
psychologist’s research has revealed human error is common and most generally beyond the 
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individual’s control” (p. 214). These attributions to error can be latent such as inappropriate 
work schedules, poor training, excessive time pressures and cognitive processes. He suggested that 
relying on self-reporting has not worked in healthcare due to healthcare’s tendency to punish 
people who report, which causes a lack of reporting creating an environment where the massive 
amount of errors continue to be unknown. Leape suggests how extensive and costly it would be 
to focus on all systemic failures continually but suggests, “methods to assist in detection of error 
such as direct observation, chart reviews, computer screening, focus groups and voluntary 
(spontaneous) reporting” (p. 217).  Once these methods were studied a process design could be 
implemented. Leape classifies design failures of processes into three categories, process design, 
task design and equipment design.  He suggest several strategic guidance through Lucian Leape 
Institute such as: transformation of the vision to a more open, transparent culture centered 
around teamwork, integrate care platforms across all venues of inpatient, outpatient and 
residential care, partner with the patient and lastly to find ‘joy and meaning in work’. 
 
And as Leape (1997) states, human error is commonly out of the hands of the individual due to 
the way our systems function and providing a culture which understands the human fallibility 
and encourages individuals to report error will be a turning point for healthcare systems. This is 
the very discussion Weiner, Hobgood and Lewis (2008) discuss in their article of The meaning of 
justice in safety incident reporting. Their definition of a just culture is “one in which the beliefs, 
assumptions, and expectations that govern behavior in an organization conform to generally held 
principles of moral conduct” (p. 404).  Not believing that a ‘one size fits all’ approach can be 
implemented, the authors developed a conceptual model based on organizational justice, 
referring to people’s perception of fairness in the workplace (Greenberg, cited in Weiner, 
Hobgood & Lewis 2008). By dividing up justice perceptions into four dimensions, distributive, 
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procedural, interpersonal and informational justice, they explain each one of these constructs link 
to different conditions and outcomes. This multilevel view of justice is much different than a 
single view of distributive justice, where the “ the disciplinary action depends on the level of 
perceived culpability” (p.408). The authors believe organizational justice research attributes 
people’s justice perceptions are linked to affective behavioral reactions such as decision/outcome 
satisfaction, job satisfaction, trust in supervisors and perceived organizational support and 
commitment lead to usefulness of this theory in healthcare incident reporting systems. 
 
Gladstone (1995) conducted one of the first significant research studies on medication error and 
underlying factors involving medication error (Hewitt, 2010, p.160). The study was conducted 
in a general hospital setting in southwest England. .  A mixed method descriptive study was used 
which reviewed incident reports, surveyed nurses who had made (drug) errors, and the nurse 
managers responsible for those nurses; and some of the nurses participated in semi-structured 
interviews. Gladstone concluded that many underlying factors create an environment to 
which nurses are set up for failure. These factors include the uncertainty of what constitutes a 
drug error, lack of mathematical skills, poor staffing, and heavy workload.  The study 
revealed that individual nurses had a fear of reporting to the nurse manager and less confidence in 
their professional work.  Only one nurse in Gladstone’s research emerged with a positive outlook 
from her experience due to her support from her manager and team. But most others indicated 
that they were treated like criminals and very reluctant to report errors again. The nurses’ answers 
in the semi-structured interviews disclosed their fears of guilt and the possible effects (of their 
error) on the patient. Nearly all nurses in Gladstone’s study had a severe loss in confidence in 
their clinical ability. 
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Gladstone’s findings on incident reporting were confirmed by Walter and Lowe’s (1998) study. 
This Australian hospital project used a qualitative approach by descriptive data collection 
methods of a self-reporting questionnaire and focus group discussions for hospital unit nurses. 
The questionnaire was used to ask nurses which events they would more likely self report as an 
incident.  The results indicated that nurses report incidents that are life threating to the patient 
and do not want any collective data about themselves. The focus groups revealed deeper 
information regarding ‘self preservation’ and ‘it depends’ attitudes. Evidence of the theme 
analysis of the nurse focus groups stated phrases of “‘self preservation’ in terms as: past experience 
of ‘getting into trouble….’, ‘it’s the way your treated after an incident’…’people need to know 
they are not going to get into trouble…’” (p.99). The other reoccurring theme suggested the 
nurses believe that the self-reporting of an error depended on what type of error and if they could 
fix the problem themselves. The conclusion to the study suggested the unpleasant disciplinary 
experiences in the past and belief that an error is not worthy of reporting unless it is life 
threatening to the patient. The monitoring the medication incidents relies mainly on the self 
report of nursing staff with much of the focus on the individual and not the process causing 
genuine fear of reprimand.  
 
Just a year later, Wakefield, et al. (1999) used 29 acute care hospitals in Iowa to complete a 
research study based on the understanding the reasons medications errors may or may not be 
voluntarily reported by nursing supervisors and nursing staff.  Using a non-random convenience 
sample to over 1300 nurses, this study explained the understanding of a four-step process by 
which nurses have to overcome barriers in order to report a medication administration error.  
The nurse had to recognize there was an error made. If the perceived error was important 
enough, for example, a missed vitamin over a miscalculation of an intravenous drip then the 
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nurse had to decide whether or not to report it. An effort by the nurse to count the cost of 
reporting the error, such as, fear of being seen as incompetent. And lastly, the administrative 
response could act as a constraint to the act of reporting since the individual nurses’ performance 
could be in question. Using a factor analysis they analyzed the responses of these four steps and 
found that it was not just one particular reason nurses did not voluntarily report but a 
combination of all the steps. Overall, there was a high level of agreement between nursing and 
nursing supervisors that the combination of fear and administrative response were significant 
indicators a nurse would not voluntarily report a medication error. 
 
Moving ahead to 2007, Throckmorton and Etchegaray (2007) conducted a study in the state of 
Texas using mail survey to randomly selected registered nurses to understand the willingness of 
nurses to report errors of various degrees of severity and to establish if knowledge of the Texas 
Nurse Practice Act was significant to the willingness to report, and if demographics played a role 
in intent to report. Out of 411 respondents, the results of the study concluded the nurses 
perceived the environment to be neutral, neither punitive nor non-punitive. But they believed 
the perception of the environment to influence whether they reported or not reported. It was 
found the nurses had a fairly good knowledge of the requirements of the state law regarding 
nursing practices. The nurses were willing to report errors resulting in ‘no harm’ to ‘death of a 
patient’ across the continuum equally. And tenured licensed nurse were more likely to report. 
The limitations to the study were found that most respondents, (53.5%) belonged to nursing 
associations where the national average in only 10%, concluding this could be an over-
representation.  
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In Taiwan a research study was conducted by Chiang, Lin, Hsu and Ma (2010) surveyed factors 
that determined hospital nurses’ failure to report medication errors. This cross-sectional design 
used a self-administered questionnaires study, which was conducted, in five tertiary hospitals in 
southern Taiwan with over 838 direct patient care nurses, excluding any managerial staff. The 
study revealed the over half of the nurses had made a medication administration error. They also 
noted that the Taiwanese nurses had a substantial different attitude to report themselves than a 
co-worker and would less likely report the co-worker. Secondly, fear of peer and manager 
reactions was the most discussed barrier in the lack of reporting from among 95% of the 
respondents. The last reason of lack of reporting medication errors was many nurses understand 
most medications that are given are not life threatening, thus they may verbally discuss the error 
but do not write a incident report placing the outcome as their basis for not reporting. This study 
reveals the nurse’s personal perception of responsibility of a medication administration error are 
stronger than a view of the systemic process flaws creating an environment for error and inability 
to learn from the error made.  
 
Hewitt (2010) writes a literature review about nurses’ perceptions of the causes of medication 
error. Using a Cumulative Index of Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL), Hewitt 
found that only five articles were published before the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) publication 
To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System in 1999 (Kohn, et al. 2000). Since 2002 – 
2008 an increase in research regarding safer healthcare revealed there were 394 articles published. 
After criteria for exclusion and inclusion occurred, Hewitt found a total of nine articles related to 
nurses and medication errors. The literature review noted medication administration involved 
multiple provider levels such as pharmacists, pharmacy techs, physicians, and nurses, but most of 
the consequences of a medication error lay at the feet of the nurse giving the medication. 
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Common themes through out the literature of why errors occurred stated by Hewitt (2010) were: 
“distractions, failure to follow the five rights of medication administration, (right patient, right 
drug, right route, right time, right dose); failure to follow protocols, fatigue or exhaustion, poor 
physician handwriting, drug look alike confusion with similar packaging, and miss-calculations” 
(p. 160).  The reasons why nurses did not report these errors from these studies suggested several 
barriers, confusion on the definition of an error, the nurse’s reputation among their peers, loss of 
professional confidence and fear of the manager’s reactions to the medication error. Hewitt’s 
conclusion to the literature review stated the medication delivery system is complex and broad. 
Nurses play only one figure in this role and leader collaboration in healthcare need to address a 
nonpunitive approach to encourage incident reporting to create safer systems. 
 
And lastly, taking a slightly different angle, Karga, et al. (2010) discusses the affects of nurses 
coping with errors made in their study. The purpose of this research article was written to look at 
nurse’s response to error in Greek hospitals. Using an adapted questionnaire from Meurier, 
Vincent and Parmar (1998) and Wu, Folkman & McPhee (1993), the study revealed high 
workload and inexperience were the leading error causes. The researchers divided the affects into 
internal and external emotional responses. High percentages of emotional responses discovered 
the nurses felt depressed, angry with themselves, inadequate and embarrassed. A slightly lower 
rated of external emotional responses of feeling angry with others, fearful of the patient’s clinical 
course, repercussions from the error, and fear of losing colleagues’ trusts. Those that accepted 
responsibility appeared to learn better from their errors than those who blamed outside sources 
but they too suffered from anxiety, incompetence and guilt. They found a correlation of how 
management handled the error to be of more significance toward a positive or negative change. 
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Summary and comments 
 
In conclusion, as Cook and Nemeth (2010) state, human error needs to show some value instead 
of a focus of an erroneous act. And the significance of the error should not be directed  into a 
‘blame approach’ (Leape, 1997), which creates pressures to cover up events. The blame approach 
takes light in what Dekker (2006) calls the ‘Old View’, explaining that erratic people degrade an 
otherwise safe system. And a ‘New View’ approach depicts that error is not random by 
systemically connects features to people, tools, task and operating systems.  Looking at the use of 
voluntary reporting in industry it is an impetrative learning opportunity for healthcare systems to 
appreciate the weaknesses in the processes and improve patient safety. And as Barach and Small 
(2000) explained, other non-medical industry has learned to improve the reporting of error by 
balancing the initiatives over the barriers. The studies on medication incident reporting give light 
to the complexity of the multiple barriers nurses have to overcome in order to report an error and 
it gives awareness that, self preservation, fear of peer rejection and manager reprimand has a great 
impact on the decision to report of an error, consequently, how the nurses’ view human error has 
a large impact on what is being reported and why. The nurse manager responses to human error 
acts as catalyst to project support or non-support within the realm of incident reporting creating 
a cyclical effect on the safety continuum. The healthcare systems view on human error continues 
to want a ‘just culture’ but lacks the execution of the theory as the inconsistencies continue to 
appear in the nurse and nurse manager’s view in incident reporting.  The role of the nurse as a 
messenger of the end result of an error needs to be acknowledged with support and 
understanding of systemic ailments within the system not to blame ‘the messenger’.  
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RESEARCH METHOD 
 
In this research we adopted a qualitative and exploratory case study approach (Blaxter, Hughes & 
Tight, 2010; Udod & Care, 2012; Rowley, 2012). As Cohen, et al. (apud in Blaxter, Hughes and 
Tight, 2010) suggests some advantages of a case study are that it draws on people’s experience 
and practices, allows the researcher to show the complexity of social life and can build on actual 
practice and experience.  
 
Data collection  
 
The sampling collection came from a major research academic hospital that employs over 10,000 
employees and includes more than 40 hospital care areas, a large research center and multiple 
community clinics. The sampling data gathered from interviews was compared to documents 
published by various healthcare organizations and nursing state laws 
 
Interviews 
 
Interview procedures 
 
Three nurse managers participants and five  inpatient acute care nurse participants were chosen 
to participate in this research study to understand nurse’s experience, value, and opinions 
(Rowley, 2012) related to human error and incident reporting.  This sampling from the academic 
hospital setting was completed in three phases. 
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The first phase completed was to identify the three hospital care units with the highest rate of 
incident reporting and three hospital care units with the lowest rate of reporting.  
This was accomplished by running a report from the incident reporting tool, DATIX/UHC 
SafetyIntelligence, Inc., of all the hospital care unit locations and the amount of incident reports 
for the last twelve months excluding the laboratory events. (The exclusion is due to the year long 
project by the Pathology Department to have any type of laboratory event place into the incident 
reporting tool- this is exclusively done by the laboratory technicians and does not involve the 
voluntary incident reporting by the nursing staff).   
 
The second phase completed was the recruitment of three nurse managers out of the six hospital 
care areas. 
 
And the third phase consisted of identifying five nurses from the same identified units. Asking 
the nurse manager for two or three suggested candidates from his/her unit for the research study 
during the interview process and randomly choosing five nurse participants completed this 
portion. 
 
Inclusionary criteria:  The nurse managers were from hospital care units. The nurse managers had 
more than or equal to 4 years experience as a manager. The registered nurses were from the same 
hospital care units as the nurse managers and had more than or equal to one year of experience.  
This gave us enough data for what is essentially a pilot study of an extremely complex problem.  
 
Ten semi-structured open-ended questions were used in this study and began with collecting 
demographic information on each participant including age, gender, educational background, 
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length of time as a registered nurse and what type of nursing unit (see Appendix A for the 
interview questions). The interviews consist of an average of approximately 60-minute. The 
interviews took place at a location the participants and researcher mutually agree.  The interview 
guideline for all participants began after signing the consent and a short explanation of the study. 
 
The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim by a certified transcription 
company and any identifying information was removed from the recording prior to handoff to 
the transcription company. In order to become familiar with the data it is suggested to transcribe 
the interviews verbatim but this is often very time consuming (Rowley, 2012). In order to 
expedite the data analysis the transcriptions were completed by an outside source.  The researcher 
listened to the audio recordings to become familiar with the content and began a thematic 
analysis (Rowley 2012). The participants were able to chose to be audio recorded or not but all 
participant agreed to a digital audiotaping. As soon as the audio recording was completely 
transcribed and returned by the certified transcription company, the participants reviewed and 
approved the transcribed interview documents by email for verification purposes.  
 
The open-ended questions were divided into two sub topics. One subtopic on human error was 
discussed to study how nurses and nurse manager define ‘human error’. The second sub-topic 
discuss was the term ‘incident reporting’ and how each nurse or nurse managers viewed incident 
reporting and the usage of incident reporting.  
Participant information 
 
The five registered nurses (RN) averaged age was 42 years old and had an average of 10 years 
experience as registered nurses.  One RN had 16 years prior experience as a Licensed Vocational 
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Nurse (LVN). All RN’s had a bachelor’s of science in nursing (BSN) and one had a master’s in 
business administration (MBA). The five RN’s worked in a medical /surgical unit, two critical 
care units and a special procedural unit. All RN participants worked under direct supervision of 
the three NM participants. 
 
 The three nurse manager (NM) ages averaged 47 years old with 18.3 years experience as RN’s 
and averaged 6 years experience as nurse managers. One NM had a nursing leadership master’s 
degree and the other two had BSN degrees.  All the NM’s had greater than six years of prior 
experience in a supervisory role before becoming a NM.   
 
Collectively, there were a variety of organizational membership selections among the nurses and 
nurse managers.  Only one nurse was a member of the American Nurses Association (ANA) and 
one a member of the Texas Nurses Association (TNA). Other participants were members of 
Texas Transplant Society, Preventative Cardiovascular Nursing Association, and American 
Association of Critical-Care Nurses (AACN) were among the membership associations. The 
nurse manager’s memberships included AACN, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI), 
American Organization of Nurse Executives (AONE), and American College of Cardiology.  
 
When asked about learning anything regarding incident reporting or human error from 
organizational websites, only one NM stated she had learned how many times a nurse made a 
mistake throughout the day but never learned more information regarding human error from any 
formal nursing organizational website. This information does lay a significant foundation as to 
who or what entity has the most influence on the nursing staff. Most of the learning and 
understanding of human error is self taught and/or influenced by the local institutional culture in 
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which they worked by stating they understood the definition of human error by their own 
personal experiences, not by a nursing course or an organizational websites. But, the healthcare 
institutions are highly influenced by participating in accreditation standards, regulating bodies 
and meeting the rules and regulations as set by state and federal laws. 
 
Ethical considerations 
 
Approval was obtained from the participating university’s institutional research board (IRB), (See 
Appendix B). Confidentiality was maintained by assigning numerical codes and unique 
pseudonyms to each participant.  All identify information was removed from the transcripts and 
no one except the researcher had access to the participant codes. A copy of the consent form 
(Appendix C) was given to the participant upon signing and agreeing to be a part of the study. 
Participants were offered no incentives or gifts as a result of participating in the research study.  
 
The participant was instructed that they could decide to withdrawal from the study at any given 
time. Upon their withdrawal from the study all interview documents/audio tapes would be 
destroyed and there would be no consequences from withdrawing from the study. This would 
include any information that was used or disclosed prior to the decision to stop participation and 
needed in order to maintain the integrity of the research study.  If there are significant new findings 
or we get any information that might change the mind of the participant about participating, we 
would give the participant the information and allow them to reconsider whether or not to 
continue. 
 
Documents 
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Document analysis was used to study healthcare organizational views and laws related to human 
error and incident reporting.  As Blaxter, Hughes and Tight (2010) suggests document elements 
were abstracted according to importance and relevance and were analyzed. The relevant 
documents chosen were: The American Nursing Association (ANA) Position Statement of Just 
Culture along with The ANA’s Code of Ethics for Nurses; The Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ) Chapter 4 on Incident Reporting, written by Wald and Shojania (2001) 
and the Texas laws regarding nursing errors made from the Texas Administrative Code Title 22, 
Part 11 Chapter 217.6 and finally, the Texas Board of Nursing Position Statement 15.17- Texas 
Board of Nursing/Board of Pharmacy, Joint Position Statement, Medication Error . The 
consideration of these chosen documents assisted in understanding healthcare systems approach 
to human error, incident reporting and just culture and findings were grouped together alongside 
others for relevance (p. 232). 
 
 
 
Data analysis 
 
As part of a data analysis of the transcribed interviews, a thematic analysis was used to collect 
particular themes within the recorded texts looking for significant statements and comparing the 
participant’s views (Baxter, Hughes & Tight, 2010).   Braun and Clark (cited in Baxter, Hughes 
and Tight, 2010) state, “becoming familiar with the data, generating initial codes, searching for 
and reviewing each theme, as well as, defining and naming the themes” (p. 233). This assisted the 
researcher to create a report analyzing the research question and the literature provided 
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understanding of the nurses’ and nurse manager’s review of human error and incident reporting. 
And by examining the transcribed texts, “a document analysis was accomplished question by 
question to compare the specific answers as a general approach”. (p. 234). 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This study examined healthcare organizational documents along with data analysis of nurse 
participants’ interviews to understand healthcare system approach to human error and how it is 
interpreted in what nurses perceive as attributions to human error and its application to incident 
reporting process. 
 
Healthcare organizational approach to human error 
 
 In concerns to errors made by nurses, the state of Texas Nurse Practice Act 2011 states, 
“Conduct required to be reported [to the Board of Nursing] if an error contributed to the 
patient’s death or serious harm”. The law goes on to state, “that a nurse does not have to be 
reported to the board unless it represents a pattern of multiple minor incidences”. The law 
defines a ‘minor’ incident stating, (2) A “’Minor incident’ means conduct by a nurse that does 
not indicate that the nurse’s continued practice poses a risk of harm to a patient or another 
person” (The Texas Occupational Code Title 22, Part 11, Chapter 217, Rule 217.16, (d)(1)(A)).  
But the minor incidents are limited and multiple errors could pose problematic as suggested, 
 
 “The nurse must be reported to peer review if a nurse commits five minor incidents in a 
12-month period. (C) If a nurse manager or supervisor believes, regardless of timeframe, 
the minor incidents indicate a pattern of practice that poses a risk of harm that cannot be 
remediated, the nurse should be reported to the Board or Peer Review Committee (The 
Texas Occupational Code Title 22, Part 11, Chapter 217, Rule 217.16 (2)(B)). 
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The state law infers that serious injury; death or a pattern of minor incidents can stand as reasons 
why a nurse could be in judgment of his/her practice and possibly lose his/her nursing license.  
 
The nursing organizational position statements are also suggestive that nurses are independently 
accountable for patient safety. As seen in the ANA’s Code of Ethics for Nurses with Interpretive 
Statements (n.d.) state, “ the nurse retains accountability and responsibility for the quality of 
practice…. accountability means to be answerable to oneself and others for one’s own actions, 
nurses are accountable for judgments made and actions taken irrespective of health care 
organizations policies or providers directives” (Provision 4.1-2). When a nurse works within the 
constraints of policies and guidelines of some type of a healthcare institution and often receives 
physician directives in the course of his/her normal everyday work more often than not a nurse 
will follow institutional guidelines, policies as she is trained to follow. The Texas Board of 
Nursing (BON) Position Statement (2013) states, “The Registered Nurses’ (RN) duty is to 
always provide safe, compassionate, and comprehensive nursing care to patients” (The Registered 
Nurse Scope of Practice 15.28, para. 1).   The weight of the organizational position and the state 
laws regarding responsibility and accountability appear to make the nurses solely accountable for 
judgments made within a complex system and to always provide safe care regardless of policy or 
provider guidelines.  
 
But in 2010, a small working group from the Congress on Nursing Practice and Economics 
wrote the Position Statement on Just Culture, which was approved by the American Nurses 
Association (ANA) Board of Directors which states, “healthcare’s culture has held individuals 
accountable for all errors or mishaps that befall patients under their care but in contrast, “a Just 
Culture, recognizes that an individual practitioner should not be held accountable for system 
 
 
30 
failings over which they have no control” (para. 6). And Barnsteiner (2011) writes in the ANA’s 
Teaching the Culture of Safety, “the focus [of error] is on what went wrong, not (emphasis by 
the author), who caused the problem, a balance is currently referred to as the ‘just culture’” (para. 
2). Supporting this concept, the Texas Board of Nursing/Board of Pharmacy, Joint Position 
Statement, Medication Error 15.17(2000) explains that attribution of error historically had been 
placed on a single practitioner but attempts to shift to a more collaborative systemic effort by 
stating, “medication errors are a multifaceted problem which may occur in any health care setting 
and acknowledge the interdisciplinary nature of medication errors and how often poor system 
design can create failure in medication administration” (para. 1-3).  
 
On the other hand, the ANA’s Position Statement on Just Culture (2010) has integrated David 
Marx’s model for Just Culture which carries a strong accountability stance of the nursing staff for 
errors made stating, “human error and adverse events should be considered outcomes to be 
measured and monitored…”(p. 3).  By utilizing this model the nurse managers will be able to 
decide what type of behavior lead to the error. This model divides three classes of human 
behavior by “simple human error” which is inadvertently doing something; “at -risk behavior” is 
a behavioral choice that increases risk where risk is not recognized or mistakenly justified; and 
“reckless behavior” is conscious disregard and unjustifiable. It also tends to focuses upon the 
individuals in the system rather than the systemic failings. It appears that somewhere along the 
line the front line staff will be made accountable for the error and the system in which the nurses’ 
structural constraints of policies, laws, work load, patient acuity, communication breakdowns, 
fatigue and training are all sent into the background instead of a backdrop of how error occurred.  
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Another way of approaching a just culture would be what Dekker (2009) states, “a basis for a just 
culture involves a normalization of incidents, so that they become a legitimate, acceptable part of 
organizational development” (p. 183). Accountability for the errors made would be similar to 
what Sharpe (2004) discusses as “forward-looking approach where responsibility is linked to 
theories and practices of goal setting and moral deliberation” (p. 13).  Sharpe goes on to say,  
 
“in a systemic approach to error emphasizes responsibility in a prospective sense. 
Responsibility takes the forms of preventative measures to improve poor system design, 
provide information about potential problems and an environment is created where it is 
safe to discuss and analyze error” (p.15). 
 
Learning how to approach a just culture is just as important as patient safety. If organizations 
want to design a culture of learning from error an acceptance of error and a level of trust has to 
be maintained in order for it to be just.  
 
 The healthcare organizational documents analyzed also discussed details in regards to the 
characteristics of incident reporting in healthcare and a nomenclature for errors made by 
providing standardization for errors based on outcome severity. 
 
Barach and Small (as cited in Wald & Shojania, 2001) discuss in the chapter for The Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), characteristics of incident reporting state, “it is 
important to focus on near misses, provide incentives for voluntary reporting, ensure 
confidentiality and emphasize systemic approaches to error analysis” (Practice Description, para. 
3). And using incentives, which have been taken from non-medical fields, should include 
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“immunity, confidentiality, outsourcing of report collation; rapid feedback to all involved and 
sustained leadership support” (Practice Description, para. 4). AHRQ has set a standard on what 
incident reporting should include and how it should be utilized. This standard would take on a 
‘forward-looking approach’ (Sharpe, 2004), which would focus on systemic vulnerabilities prior 
to a patient injury, and it would also protect the reporters of incidents to increase the likelihood 
of continued reporting. 
 
For more than decade a nomenclature has developed which focuses on outcome severity in order 
to attempt to decrease medical injury by holding hospitals accountable for reporting these 
incidents to healthcare organizations or accreditation bodies.  A variety of government agencies 
began to defined and/or categorized severe events or medical injury (Wald & Shojania, 2001). In 
1995, The Joint Commission (TJC) categorized a term ‘sentinel event’ and highly recommended 
hospitals to report these events from a list of serious events created by the TJC, which involved 
death or serious physical or psychological injury (Wald & Shojania, 2001). According to Wald 
and Shojania (2001), another set of severity categories was supported by the AHRQ, “in an 
attempt to mimic complex, high-risk industries, healthcare proposed to define medical errors in 
three basic categories: ‘adverse events’, ‘no harm events’ and ‘near misses’. And a third category of 
severity is connected to reimbursement funds from the government to hospitals was created for 
the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) according to Levinson (2010),  
 
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 require that the Office of Inspector General 
report to Congress regarding the incident of ‘never events’ among Medicare beneficiaries. 
The Medicare program will deny payment or recoup payment for services furnished in 
connection with such events (p. i).  
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‘Never events’ comes from a list 26 serious reportable events by the National Quality Forum 
(NQF), which should never occur in a hospital for example: wrong site surgery, retained foreign 
object, a fall with injury, or any healthcare acquired infection (HAC) are items on the list (p. 2).  
The government will not pay the hospital for a serious medical injury that happened to one of 
their beneficiaries so keeping track of those events is mandated.  
 
And lastly, at the local hospital level, one of the main reasons there is a focus of severity of events 
in the healthcare incident reporting system is stated by Wald & Shojania (2001) is, “because risk 
management departments tend to oversee incident reporting system in some capacity, these 
systems more often focus on incident outcomes, not categories” (Practice Description Section, 
para. 7). 
 
 The healthcare organizational approach to human error appears to vacillate between two 
standards. One in which the law counts minor errors; mandates reporting a nurse involved in 
severe injury or death and holds nurses accountable regardless of policies/ procedures 
implemented by their organizations to an opposing standard which support systemic approaches 
broadening the multifaceted interdisciplinary complexity of healthcare and encourages a just 
culture.  The structure of incident reporting has been put in place by the national healthcare 
organizations with use of the nomenclature of severity definition but is framed around the local 
cultures’ utilization.  As stated by Wald and Shojania, (2001), “what is written in the reports 
often has to do with the practice within each particular institution due to the variability and the 
nature of the incident reporting, and are often filled with hindsight bias, lost information, lost 
contextual clues and can focus on individual performance instead of increasing institutional 
 
 
34 
quality improvement programs” (Comment section, para. 3) Given this context, we will turn to 
the data collected regarding how nurses perceive their organization’s view of human error, how 
the nurses’ define human error and how these definitions are expressed in incident reporting.  
Nurses’  perception of organizational view of human error 
 
The nurses’ perception of the organizational view of human error appeared to be dependent on 
how the nurse manager handled the incidents at the unit  level. Elements of severity bias, ‘illusion 
of control’, and attempting to reach perfection were underlying themes from topics discussed by 
the nurse participants. They  also  reflected on their perceived  inadequacies of themselves or their 
peers to be the cause of trouble.  
 
Participant #RN4 stated the hospital defined, and managed (error) differently depending on its 
severity. If it is minor, it might be overlooked, if no one is harmed. The RN participant goes on 
to say, if it were mild or moderate error you would be talked to by your manager, then written up 
and counseled, you could get probation and then termination if it was severe. The minor offense, 
as stated by this participant, was to tell someone to help another staff member pick up blood at 
the blood bank over three different times before it was done.  The major offense was finding a co-
worker asleep on the job four times. To solve the system’s process for transporting blood 
products a review of the entire process would be a solution instead of ‘blame’ set upon one 
individual who may have other responsibilities, time constraints and workload complications. 
This illustration given by the participant is weighed with a backward-looking accountability, 
(Sharpe, 2004) of behavior-based example. It is also reasonable to believe a person should not be 
sleeping on the job. But what Sharpe (2004) called a  ‘backward-looking’ approach to 
accountability links the practice of praising and blaming when we speak of holding someone 
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responsible such as “ he/she was responsible for harming the patient” (p.13) or we could say, “ 
falling a sleep on the job” has a retrospective focus of the outcome instead of learning why the 
person was falling asleep on the job or what caused the person to not go pick up the blood from 
the blood bank.  As Woods and Cook  (2002) state, blaming the individual is far easier than 
understanding the ‘second story’ and to discover the multiple contributors (p. 137). When 
normal people are doing their normal work bound by their everyday procedural boundaries and 
an injury occurs, this only proves the system had weaknesses all along and when the opportunity 
arose the systemic failures became apparent (Dekker, 2005). For example, systemic contributing 
factors, which could cause a nurse to fall a sleep on the job in a normal setting, could be a 
variability of workload with long periods of low intensity and drowsiness could take over on a 
night shift.  
 
This participant suggested that a severe event would be reported to the manager and a lesser event 
would have less impact.  The connection of discussing the event with the manager is tied to the 
severity of the event. It is possible that the healthcare organizational systems support  severity bias 
that could lead to less emphasis on near miss or unsafe conditions and as Wald and Shojania, 
(2001) explain, “AHRQ estimates that ‘near misses’ occur 3-300 times more often than an 
adverse event, which reaches the patient” (Practice Description, para. 2).  If minor errors are 
often overlooked, valuable learning opportunities are lost and a continuous of a backward 
approach resumes to be the basis of change.  
 
Participant #RN7 explained the organizational view of human error came from a past experience, 
by stating he/she was involved in an investigation using a root cause analysis (RCA) and was 
found by his/her supervisors to be the cause of the error and placed on probation. This RN asked 
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the question, if the human error was handled by the institution as post facto, do we ever handle it 
pre facto? The RN suggests, it is always best to deal with an issue before it happens. This RN’s 
perception of human error was very focused on a painful personal experience he/she discussed an 
error where the medications were given to the wrong patient and judgment was placed on his/her 
decision-making skills. Using these statements it appears the RN believed an organization could 
know all the elements, which could create an error. Three elements are revealed in these 
thoughts. One is the illusion that error can be controlled (Cook & Nemeth, 2010) secondly, 
perfection can be obtainable, and thirdly, the trap of believing one individual’s judgment created 
an error.  
 
 By stating an organization should correct problems before they arise creates an ‘illusion of 
control’ (Cook & Nemeth, 2010). And by “creating the ‘illusion of control’ over the situation an 
error can be attributed to an individual then making future failures  lessen” (p. 91). The concept 
that an organization believes its systems to be perfect provides a “defense against entanglement” 
(p. 90). The organization can attempt to distance themselves from an error made and set in 
motion that a human was the cause of the error. This RN observed that all systems could be 
manufactured to run perfectly which would leave only the element of the human to make the 
error.  
 
Secondly, is there a true notion that  a perfection point can be reached? This concept appears to 
follows the healthcare workers belief of their professional practice can reach a pinnacle of 
perfection (Leape, et al., 2011) where they will never make an error. This leaves out the 
understanding of the systems complexities that errors and accidents are only remotely related. 
Every socio-technical aspect of complex systems can lead to an unintended consequence due to its 
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very complexity. Living and breathing in complex systems, humans will never make 
improvements to system vulnerabilities if they attempt to the climb the pinnacle of perfection. It 
is this understanding of the three insights as stated by Dekker (2006), “sources of error are 
structural not personal; errors and accidents are only remotely related and accidents are not the 
result of a breakdown” (p. 17). 
 
Thirdly, the judgments and reaction of the supervisors focused on the fact that the RN made a 
poor judgment creating an ‘error’. In fact, as pointed out in the document analysis, the Texas 
BON Position Statement 15.28 confirms, “RNs are accountable and responsible for the quality 
of nursing care and must exercise prudent nursing judgment at all times”. This focus on the RN’s 
judgment misses the ‘deeper understanding’ (Dekker, 2002, 2006) of the environment in which 
the RN gave the wrong medications such as: lack of staffing, patient acuity, patient load, and 
distractions (Gladstone, 1995). The supervisor’s punitive actions show ‘hindsight bias’, (Dekker, 
2002, 2006), scapegoating (Cooke, 2007; Dekker, 2002,2006; Dekker, Nyce & Myers, 2012; 
Karga, et al. 2011; Parker & Lawton, 2003) and blame (Leape, 1997; Leape, et al., 2009) and a 
true example of the ‘illusion of control’ (Cook & Nemeth, 2010). The organization would be 
free of blame if the RN were punished. The RN had been working in a normal every day work 
environment.  By focusing on the error as a personal judgment error, the system stays the same 
and the illusion continues that the organization has perfect systems. 
 
The participants also discussed their organizational view of staff members much like they were 
the source of trouble or ‘bad apples’. Participant #RN4 stated they (RNs) are just lazy; you have 
to stay on their butts! Participant #RN1 stated, some individuals who do things they know are 
not right. They choose to do things that are blatant that I would identify through patterns of 
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behavior. It is their behavior, the way they choose to do their life.  Both the nurse participants 
describe the ‘bad apple’ concept as Dekker (2002) explains; “if their (staff) behavior were better 
the system would be safer” (p. 7). These ‘bad apples’ are the primary focus instead of systemic 
flaws (Dekker, 2002, 2006; Parker & Lawton, 2003). Flaws in the system could be short-staff, 
(Cook, 2007; Reason, 2000; Udod & Care, 2012), high acuity, (Gladstone, 1995), burnout, 
(Dekker & Nyce, 2013;Karga, et al. 2011; Udod & Care, 2012;) lack of education, (Barach & 
Small, 1966) and time (Gladstone, 1995; Udod & Care, 2012).  
 
The #RN1’s example of blatant error was about a nurse with three years experience but was a 
new employee to this hospital. The nurse had to administer blood products and failed to have a 
consent form signed prior to blood administration. The preceptor training this RN explained 
that the hospital policy is to get consent every time blood is administered and the NM felt like 
this consent process was covered in the orientation process. The nurse failed to get the consent on 
two other occasions. The last time, the RN gave the blood, the RN wrote out a consent form 
after the fact and called the doctor to sign the consent after the blood administration. When it 
was over, the preceptor told the NM. The RN was terminated from the position due to a pattern 
of behavior. 
 
A pattern of behavior appears to be the key for the termination of this RN.  This pattern of 
behavior is substantiated in the state nursing laws,  “that a nurse does not have to be reported to 
the board unless it represents a pattern of multiple minor incidences”, (Texas Occupational Code 
Title 22, Part 11, Chapter 217, Rule 217.16). This nurse was not reported to the board of 
nursing (BON) but instead terminated due to the lack of learnability from errors made.  It is 
difficult to speak with authority on this particular example since all the facts are not known. But 
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as Cook and Nemeth (2010) discuss this idea regarding the usefulness of error, “as an 
organizational defense, human error serves as a kind of lightening rod that conducts the 
potentially harmful consequences produced by an accident along an (organizational) pathway” 
(p.91). This can also be known as scapegoating or getting rid of the ‘bad apple’ and the illusion 
would be the system has now become better since the ‘bad apple’ is gone.   
 
Nurses’  definitions of human error 
 
In defining human error seven of the eight nurse participants articulated inadequacy, competency 
and responsibility as key themes of human error. One participant articulated understanding of 
human error to be an unintentional mishap. 
 
The participants discussed a large proportion of  inadequacies as attributions to the definition of 
human error. Examples of such inadequacies  are relayed by Participant #RN4, who states human 
error is, “misguidance; lack of judgment; lack of education; lack of proper training, not 
meticulous enough and a lot of laziness”. Participant #RN7 stating, “ human error is a mistake 
committed by an individual in the practice of nursing whereby prudence was not practiced or 
observed that lead to committing a breach in public safety”. And Participant #RN8 stated, 
human error is committed by staff arising from behavior or deviations from protocol or standards 
of care.  The participants’ statements leave out the circumstances surrounding how healthcare 
staff are often set in motion by their surrounding cultural conditions, which created the 
environment for an error to occur (Dekker, Preface xi).  As Woods, et al. (2010) stated “’human 
error’ is markedly complex” (p.5) and error usually involves technology and interactions with 
others, it is not an isolated event. 
 
 
40 
 
This participant attributed human error toward one significant concept to where the nurse’s 
competence had to match up with the criticality of his/her patient population by stating that 
human error to a nurse goes back to patient load. Using an example, you can’t put an agency 
nurse floating out to one area that does not match their expertise. It appears the nurse’s answer 
reveals a belief that with a perfect match of training, skill and competency an error will not occur. 
What seems to be a lack of understanding of this participant is even if a nurse’s competency 
matching his/her clinical competency, failings can still occur due to the systemic complexity.  
 
Participant #RN6 stated in his/her definition of human error that nurses’ need to take 
responsibility and not sweep it under the rug. What you do can literally harm a patient and it 
isn’t right to not take responsibility for your errors. The participant’s desire was to take 
ownership of errors made and not hide it. Nursing organizational documents support 
responsibility of the nurse stating that the nurse is responsible for the safety of their patients at all 
times (ANA’s Code of Ethics for Nurses with Interpretive Statements, n.d.). Many nurses would 
probably be open to dialogue about an error made but often the culture is not conducive to open 
dialogue without fear of retaliation. Sweeping error under the rug does not mean the nurse does 
not take responsibility for the error, it could mean he/she is afraid to tell anyone for fear of 
retribution. And retribution is not supported by the ANA Nursing Bill of Rights, which state, “ 
nurses have the right to freely and openly advocate for themselves and their patients, without fear 
of retribution” (ANA, NursingWorld, para. 2).  
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 And lastly, Participant #RN2 discussed human error definition was someone who makes a 
mistake unknowingly or unintentionally thinking it was the right thing to do at the time because 
at the moment I did it, I thought it was the right thing to do. Using an example by saying, 
 
 ‘ when a bedside clinician is doing their everyday tasks and she forgets to check the 
dosage of a medication and gives the medicine to the patient not knowing the physician 
ordered a different dosage amount. We, as ‘human beings’, get task oriented and we don’t 
think about what we are doing and unknowingly commit errors’. 
 
The document analysis of healthcare organizational view and state laws support the view that 
nurses need to hold themselves responsible, accountable for patient safety concerns regardless of 
what the policies and procedures of the organizations in which they work (ANA’s Code of Ethics 
for Nurses with Interpretive Statements, Provision 4.1-2) this is substantiated by the nurses’ 
understanding of inadequacy, competency and responsibility to be the essence of human error. 
But in the last few years’ healthcare organizational views and state laws have made attempts to 
look at more systemic approaches. The Participant #RN2 statement reveals that individual nurses 
may understand the interdisciplinary nature of medication errors and often poor systemic design 
which can create an environment for failure (Texas Board of Nursing/Board of Pharmacy, Joint 
Position Statement, Medication Error 15.17, 2000).  
 
 
Nurses’  uti l ization of incident reporting and associated barriers  
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After analysis of how nurses define human error by explaining inadequacies, competency and 
responsibility as the basis of their definition, it is significant to understand how nurses apply their 
definitions of human error in incident reporting.  Essential themes discussed by the participants 
were, why nurses report incidents and barriers associated with incident reporting among nurses’ 
and nurse managers’. 
 
Why nurses report 
 
The most common reason for incident reporting was due to the severity of the event. All eight 
nurse participants agreed that an incident with a high severity should be told to the nurse 
manager (NM) and placed into the incident reporting tool by statements such as: “the more 
severe, of course, you tell your NM”;” usually it is the severity of the issue is how I decide to write 
an incident report”; “if it is a sentinel event I will report it”. The commonality of this view is 
understandable due the injury of a patient, disclosure to the patient and family, and the legal 
ramifications. But often by categorizing adverse events into severity classes gives a false sense of 
accountability is placed on the reporter of a severe event as opposed to a reporter of a ‘near miss’ 
or a minor event. And as (Sharp, 2004) states, “responsibility in the retrospective sense focuses on 
outcomes”, where as a “prospective responsibility is oriented to the deliberative and practical 
processes involved in setting and meeting goals” (p.14). Whether a severe, minor or ‘near miss’ 
event occurred the same review of systemic weaknesses should occur. The system of incident 
reporting should not always be based on the effects of the patient but the potential of unsafe 
conditions that are often repeatable within the systemic processes. 
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The second reason stated by the participants for reporting was tattling on each other or another 
department. Several comments were stated regarding telling on each other such as: “people place 
incident [reports] on me so I will put them in on them!” (Participant #4)  and “instead of helping 
me they placed an incident report on me!” (Participant #5). Or departmental retaliation was 
stated, “the lab is reporting all under filled lab specimens, now nursing is telling on the lab by 
writing an incident report because the lab didn’t get the tests done on time!” (Participant #6).  
The usage of the incident reporting tool as a tattling tool is suggestive of two concepts. The first 
concept is scapegoating, due to the fear of being the target of blame a person will point the finger 
at another individual or department (Cooke, 2007;Dekker, 2002, 2005, 2006; Dekker, Nyce & 
Myers, 2012; Karga, et al., 2011) and secondly, the lack of understanding of collaborative 
accountability (Sharpe, 2004). Since the personnel closest to the patient are often the one most 
weighted with accountability, a push to move some of this responsibility to another department 
can appear as a negative approach but it could be due to the erroneous placement of 
accountability to the nursing staff (Bosk, 2003; Sharp, 2004). A change in an approach from 
retrospective to prospective approach would move the paradigm of accountability to a 
collaborative accountability, (Sharpe, 2004) which could equalize portions of the process failures 
and mitigate the finger pointing.  
 
To go along with tattling the third motivation appeared to be self-preservation. Participant 
#RN4 stated, “Every body has to watch their own butts. The manager may think she knows who 
did it (caused the error) but if you are not the one that gets to the manager first then the blame 
goes on you”. Also Participant #RN5 stated, “stories get twisted from what the nurses and 
physicians say and it depends on how the incident is presented”. Three out of the five nurses 
interviewed stated they would write an incident report involving a peer rather than themselves 
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using statements such as: “ its better him that me”, “ it is easier to look at the other person than 
yourself “. Leape (2009) explains this concept as he states “healthcare’s bad habit of tendency to 
blame and punish individuals when an error occurs dies very slowly” (p. 3).  This can be 
attributed to how innately healthcare providers see themselves within the system.  And Leape 
(2009) continues by stating, “doctors and nurses have been taught to believe if they do their own 
job right there will be no problems” (p.3). How the story is presented to the NM only shows an 
individual’s perceptions of events, where an error occurred. The line of thinking about how an 
incident occurred goes back to the primary focus is an individual in the system instead of 
systemic flaws (Dekker, 2002, 2006; Parker & Lawton, 2003). 
 
Lastly, personal gain was attributed in one of the nurses’ interviews. The RN#2 interviewed 
stated he/she had concerns for why nurses had increased reporting on her unit and found out it 
was because the nurses were “getting credit on the clinical ladder for reporting”. The clinical 
ladder is a voluntary program used to recognize, and reward staff nurses from direct patient care 
areas who can apply for promotion by following a variety of activities such as: serving on 
committees, demonstrating excellent patient care in complex situations, providing education and 
participating in quality improvement initiative among other listed items (The Ohio State 
University, Clinical Ladder, n.d.). It is a positive step to promote programs where nurses teach 
each other and join into the collaborative efforts to improve their skill and expertise. Adding 
incident reporting to the list of items to gain promotion can lead to interesting debate. Is the 
nurse going to write an incident report where she was found lacking? Or write a report where she 
caught a problem before it happened? Or maybe a peer who did something wrong? If the nurse 
reports an event she was involved would she still be promoted? It appears from the interviews 
regarding definitions of human error that a large focus of attribution of human error was on 
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individual behavior such as laziness, not prudent enough or meticulous enough. If this is the case, 
improvement strategies will not be gained by adding incident reporting to the list of 
improvement approaches for nurse promotion.  
 
On the other hand, Wald and Shojania (2001) discuss the endemic of underreporting in the 
United States with only 1.5% of all adverse events result in an incident report. Encouraging 
reporting of error is a valuable tool but what is being reported and how it is reported often 
focuses on the individual (Cook & Nemeth, 2010; Dekker, 2002, 2004, 2006; Leape, 1997, 
2009; Leape, et al., 2009; Woods, et al., 2010) and this is attested from what the interviewees 
stated in the definitions of human error. Barach and Small (2000) suggest, “better reporting 
systems promote incentives for reporting of errors, such as philanthropic, integrity, educational 
and cathartic”(p.761) to increase reporting to overcome extreme barriers front line reporters face. 
If the frontline staff believes the incident reports have some systemic value of process 
improvement, promoting the usage from a clinical ladder program is valuable to the promotion 
of safety. But if the continuation of the same rhetoric of individual failure and scapegoating 
continue within the reports the incident reports are of no value.  
 
Nurses’  barriers in incident reporting 
 
Barriers to overcome in incident reporting were fear of retaliation, punishment, lack of respect, 
trust and just culture. The barriers mention by interviewees were statements such as, “Incident 
reporting informs management an error has been committed and retaliation is either on the way 
or it is coming”(Participant #RN7); “People are scared they will be reprimanded, afraid of losing 
their license”(Participant #RN6); “perception of fear of disciplinary actions, it is difficult to trust 
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the system”(Participant #RN8).  Although, much of healthcare organizational literature promotes 
a less blame approach and more of a just culture approach (Leape, 1997, 2009; Leape, et al., 
2009; Weiner, et al., 2008; ANA Position Statement on Just Culture, 2010), it has yet to 
infiltrate the ranks of front line users by the interviewees statements mentioned above. The 
nursing literature reviewed suggested the same barriers existed such as fear of punishment, fear of 
peer confidence, (Chiang, et al., 2010; Gladstone, 1995;Karga, et al., 2011) manager reaction, 
and trust (Gladstone, 1995; Hewitt, 2010, Wakefield, et al., 1999;Walker & Lowe, 1998).  
 
These barriers continue to enlighten the fact that the nurses perceive the crosshairs of error lie 
upon the individual as seen in their definition of human error by the nurses statements that the 
nurse’s themselves or peers were not meticulous enough, good enough, lazy….and someone 
wrote an incident report on them. This individual behavior focus in the incident reporting 
system is used to communicate the faulty behavior of others/themselves within the system. The 
nurses continue focus at the individual within the system instead of teamwork, trusting each 
other and looking for the ‘systemic vulnerabilities’ (Woods & Cook, 2002). 
 
The pressure from the healthcare organizations and the nursing state law have explained both 
sides of this coin with these concepts that nurses have to be responsible at all times for the safety 
of their patients, (ANA’s Code of Ethics for Nurses with Interpretive Statements, n.d.), and the 
state law which counts reportable errors against the nurse, even minor ones (Texas Occupational 
Code Title 22, Part 11, Chapter 217, Rule 217.16) but with the other side of the coin, healthcare 
organizations do not support retaliation according to ANA Nursing Bill of Rights, which state, “ 
nurses have the right to freely and openly advocate for themselves and their patients, without fear 
of retribution” (ANA, NursingWorld, #4). And Barnsteiner (2011) writes, “the focus [on error] 
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is on what went wrong, not (emphasis is the author), who caused the problem, a balance is 
currently referred to as the ‘just culture’” (ANA’s Teaching the Culture of Safety, para. 2).  And 
supported by the ANA Position Statement on Just Culture, (2010) the current emphasis should 
be on the systemic failings and not the individual.  
 
A barrier for reporting is the lack of a just culture. And as Participant #RN2 openly discussed her 
belief about the ‘just culture’ concept said, “bottom line is when something isn’t right it goes 
right back to the person at the bedside. How just is that?” A culture cannot be just as long as the 
system is unclear on the normalcy of error and the environment in which they work remains 
untouched due to the constant focus of the individuals within the system that appear to not 
measure up to standards, or a policy/procedure, and errors are counted. Secondly, as Dekker 
(2007) suggests, having a just culture takes in all views and angles of a story , and compromises 
through the discovery negotiating with  all parties; protecting those involved and proportions 
accountability. But the ANA Position Statement on Just Culture (2010) supports a model that 
clearly focuses on analyzing behavior of individuals and not on the systemic vulnerabilities which 
decreases the opportunities to look for second-stories (Dekker, 2005,2006,2008; Woods & 
Cook, 2002) 
 
Brunt (2010) states, regular monitoring of medical mishaps or injury should have open 
discussions of safety risks and barriers to safety, ensuring the practitioners and caregivers involved 
in the events are given attention that is just, respectful, compassionate, supportive and timely. 
But apparently these nurses do perceive barriers of fear and lack of trust in the system if the 
nurses believe retaliation is on its way, they cannot trust the system and they are treated unfairly.  
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Nurse Managers’  Barriers in Incident Reporting 
 
Along with nurses’ barriers, nurse managers face unique challenges with incident reporting. Three 
of the eight participants were nurse managers (NM) and discussed their role in reviewing incident 
reports and disclosure of error. Much of the previous literature reveals NM reaction to be 
extremely vital to the nurses’ feelings of guilt, loss of confidence and willingness to continue 
incident reporting (Gladstone, 1995;Hewitt, 2010;Walker & Lowe 1998). The participants 
discussed story distortion, nurse manager approach and one nurse discusses his/her ethos 
connection with errors made as it related to the nurse manager’s reaction to errors. 
 
Participant #RN2, as a nurse manager openly stated, “stories often get twisted and focus on the 
individual in the story and is very subjective and that is why the incident report was written”. 
The NM stated she “usually takes her time and investigates the story to ask other staff members 
or even the patient who might have complained”. She stated she tried not to react to quickly. 
Again, the NM appears to be forced to focus on the individual because she is unsure of the 
distorted story told. After an investigation she stated, it is really hard to know what to do. I go 
with my ‘gut’ feeling, try to focus if there is a policy or guideline and if it has been broken”. She 
goes on the say; “sometimes we need to break policy to save a patient’s life”. Managing others has 
been identified as a significant stressor for nurse managers (Udod & Care, 2012). These stressors 
are often derived from manager turn over and lack of resources to provide adequate patient care. 
And as the NM’s stated, they are often left to understand managing others by his/her own 
personal experience and with no significant management training.  
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This NM appears to mistrust the story as told to her by the nurse and the second barrier is the 
NM’s view of using policy breaking as a guide to errors or accidents. Mistrust and suspicion 
among the nurses toward management were key factors creating challenges for the nurse 
managers. Mistrust among nurses was validated among nursing staff when interviewed. Three out 
of the five nurses interviewed stated they would not share an error they made with a peer and one 
nurse stated when she did it was discussed in a staff meeting and she walked around with her tail 
between her legs and she would not do it again. And another stated I would not tell my peers 
because they will go back and tell on me. And secondly, breaking policy as a guideline reveals that 
accidents are apparently simplistic instead of comprehending the system’s complexity and the 
work constraints when the error was made (Dekker, 2006). And as McDonald, Waring & 
Harrison (2006) discuss, “when a blame culture exist there is a strong emphasis on rules and 
standardization with the assumption that a ‘share set of beliefs’ will be the basis for clinical 
guidelines and reduce the scope of individuals own judgment in practice” (p. 180). This practice 
tends to focus more on the individual personality traits and attributing error to poor judgments 
and overlooking situational and environmental factors. 
 
The managers all state they support incident reporting and Participant #RN2 admits she just 
now understands how incident reporting should not be punitive. She states, my staff still doesn’t 
get it. And remarks how she attempts to respond to erroneous events by investigating the story 
further before reacting and talking about the incidents in the staff meetings and want the 
department to take accountability on what they have done and fix it moving forward.  This NM 
attempted to look at the second story (Dekker, 2005, 2006; Woods & Cook, 2002; Woods, et 
al., 2010). This appeared to be a newer concept for this NM as she worked through her newer 
approach and tried to share errors made in a way that her staff could all learn from the error in a 
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forward-looking approach (Sharpe, 2004).  The struggle is to share these errors outside the 
department and to be more transparent with each other (Leape, 1997;Leape, et al. 2009). One 
brave step for this NM was to begin to share these incidents in a staff meeting in general terms 
for learning from error and teambuilding. Leape, (1997) states, “teambuilding requires a 
supportive environment and skilled leadership to help avoid mistakes” (p. 220). The frustration 
of the staff “not getting it” is directly related to the NM’s past reactions to errors made. If the 
NM just now understands that incident reporting is not a punitive concept, it may take a while 
for the nurses to believe it will not be punitive and to trust the NM. As one nurse interviewed, 
who had been placed on six months probation due to erroneous administration of medications, 
he/she was very unlikely to report an incident again because of the suffering endured from one 
event. Just one blame/shame event can erode the trust within the system (Leape, 1997, 2009; 
Leape et al. 2009). 
 
Participant#3RN stated as a manager she functions much like a ‘mom’. We have a small group 
and a good relationship. They tell me everything. If it isn’t reported it is probably because they 
didn’t know it happened. I usually ask ‘what happened?’ and how are we, we, we going to fix it so 
it doesn’t happen again?  She added, because no one lives in a vacuum. This is an example of a 
forward-looking approach (Sharpe, 2004). By attempting to adjust and adapt after an error 
occurred can be beneficial for the staff and increase accountability, not stifle it. Individuals can be 
held accountable without blaming them (Dekker, 2009). The ‘mom’ approach appears very 
supportive and trusting. But the managers appear to want to cover for their staff as much as 
possible. The NM’s are told about an error made and they decide whether it should be placed 
into the incident reporting tool. This participant states, I believe in incident reporting, it is just 
‘part of me’ but my concern for punitive action against the person makes it difficult to trust the 
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system. The transparency and learning from error often does not cross over one department to 
the next. As Leape, et al (2009) discusses “healthcare leaders have been far too timid about 
becoming truly transparent between caregivers, patients, between organizations and the public” 
(p. 425). One may want to become transparent but historically, other leaders have not been on 
the same page. Once the mishap or error is placed into an incident reporting tool the NM may 
not be able to protect his/her staff member. 
 
Another challenge NM’s face is to support staff when reporting an incident. The support of a 
NM is important for the continuum of incident reporting (Gladstone, 1995;Hewitt, 2010; 
Karga, et al. 2011; Leape, 1997; Leape, et al., 2009). But by connecting dispositional 
characteristics to human error a conflict arises. For instance, one nurse participant discusses how 
he/she attributes nursing ethos with support from the NM along with errors made. Participant 
#RN5 stated, “having a good relationship and rapport with my manager has made a difference in 
my reporting. I think she thinks I am a good nurse and I don’t make mistakes all the time. She 
will ask what is causing you to have these errors?” What is revealed in the second portion of 
his/her statement is the very essence of how the nurse believes that if he/she is a ‘good nurse’, 
he/she will not make mistakes. He/she correlates the attribution of good character or ethos with 
errors made.  According to Meurier, Vincent and Parmar, (1998) “this may be related to the 
strong professional ethos, which exists among nurses that take responsibility for their actions” (p. 
349). This is also supported by the training of nurses from their nursing infancy stating in the 
ANA Code of Ethics for Nurses with Interpretive Statements that, “nurses are accountable for 
judgments made and actions taken in the course of nursing practice, irrespective of health care 
organizations policies or providers directives” (Provision, 4.2). The strong emphasis of moral 
character and nurse judgment in healthcare organizational position statements overpowers the 
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systemic complexities within the healthcare delivery of safe patient care. Woods, et al., (2010) 
discusses this view of human error explanation, “that human performance is substandard and 
flawed when viewed in retrospect and lead directly to the negative outcome. This approach 
retards any advances in our understanding of how complex systems fail and the role of human 
practitioners in both successful and unsuccessful system operations” (p. 5). 
 
Assisting nurse managers in their role and the challenges they face is fairly absent in the nursing 
organizational literature.  The only statement found in the document analysis regarding managers 
was in the ANA Code of Ethics for Nurses with Interpretive Statements (2001) states,  “The 
nurse as manger must establish, maintain, and promote conditions of employment that enable 
nurses within that organization to practice in accord with accepted standards of nursing practice 
and provide a nursing and health care work environment that meets the standards and guidelines 
of nursing practice” (Provision, 7.2). But in personal communication with an ANA leader, it was 
stated a new position statement for the management process has not yet been developed but they 
would entertain the idea (C. Bickford, personal communication, August 19, 2013). 
 
Overall the NM’s interviewed appeared very supportive of their own staff and attempted in a 
variety of ways to share errors made with a forward-looking approach (Sharpe, 2004) and 
investigated errors to glean a second-story (Dekker, 2004, 2006; Woods & Cook, 2002; Woods, 
et al., 2010) but the NM could become bogged down in the types of mishaps communicated to 
them appeared very individually focused. The nurse’s focus of moral character connected to lack 
of errors made reveals the deep seeded ethos of nursing practice strongly influenced by 
organizational standards of nursing practice but the nurse needed the support of the NM to 
 
 
53 
believe she was a ‘good’ nurse. Nurse Management style is apparently left to the local level which 
many NM have limited resources and support (Udod & Care, 2012). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This study contributes to the nursing literature as an exploration of the significance of the way 
the healthcare approaches human error and how it impacts incident reporting in the healthcare 
system. We show that often the nurse reporting may depict a small window in his/her description 
of the incident and the nurse manager’s view of that narrative may be tainted by  forethought of 
human error definitions instead of forming a broader view of the system.   The broader systems 
defining ‘just culture’   may not be enough to move the ‘tipping point’ to a more systemic 
supportive approach. Two subject areas were discussed: the two human error approaches from 
safety science literature, and nursing research studies on the underlying factors of nurse incident 
reporting. 
 
Our findings suggest that the healthcare systems approach to human error conveys elements of 
both the Old View (OV) approach and the New View (NV) approach. The OV approach 
elements can be seen in the nursing organizational documents and state laws that lay a 
foundation of individual accountability upon the nursing roles with statements suggesting nurses 
independently are accountable for patient safety and judgments made irrespective of hospital 
policies or providers directives (ANA Code of Ethics for Nurses with interpretive statements, 
Provision 4.1-2) and the Texas state laws for registered nurses discusses the RN’s duty is to always 
provide safe care to the patients (Texas Board of Nursing Position Statement, The Registered 
Nurse Scope of Practice 15.28, 2013)  supported by the Texas state laws  which continue to 
count minor errors(Texas Occupational Code Title 22, Part 11, Chapter 217, Rule 217.16).  
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In like manner, elements of the OV approach such as severity bias, bad apple, scapegoating, 
tattling, illusions of control were revealed by the participants. The way nurses define human error 
focuses more on nursing ethos of pressure of perfection for individual behavior rather than 
understanding the value of normalizing errors and adapting the system (Dekker, 2004, 2006; 
Woods, et al. 2010). It was particularly noted nurses’ views were more about inadequacies, 
incompetence and irresponsible behavior within the system. Could this understanding of human 
error come from the standards set by nursing organizational values and state laws that 
independently separate nursing clinical judgment from the institutional guidelines in which the 
nurses work and laws counting the number of minor errors to support punitive actions? 
 
This study also revealed a backlash of the healthcare organizational drive to standardize errors or 
injury made to a harm score with the more severe or highest harm scores were more likely to be 
reported to the NM (Wald & Shojania, 2001). This standardization often leads to a backward-
looking approach (Sharpe, 2004) and blame, or getting rid of the bad apple, which they believed, 
would improve the otherwise safe system (Dekker, 2002).   
 
Incident reporting analyzed exposed the same historic reasons for reporting or not reporting error 
such as fear, mistrust, retaliation, and self-preservation (Chiang, et al., 2010; Gladstone, 1995; 
Hewitt, 2010;Karga, et al., 2011; Wakefield, et al., 1999;Walker & Lowe, 1998) due to 
healthcare’s bad habit of blaming each other (Leape, 2009). Although, much of the nursing 
organizational documents supported a more just culture approach (ANA Position Statement on 
Just Culture, 2010;Leape, 1997, 2009; Leape, et al., 2009; Weiner, et al., 2008) it appeared to 
not be able to override the nursing ethos of individual attributions of error. And this was 
understood best by the nurse’s statement regarding her relationship with her NM when she 
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stated, I think she thinks I am a good nurse and I don’t make mistakes all the time. This 
perception is that if you are ‘good’, prudent, and vigilant at all times you can predict and stop 
error from occurring. 
 
The NV approach could be seen more in the NM’s definitions of human error but it was difficult 
to analyze if the NV approach discussion was in fact, a  NV approach or a derailing of the OV 
approach believing at some point the systemic failing mentioned by the participants of the lack of 
education, and training would someday reach a pinnacle point of perfection where they would 
not make mistakes. Document analysis also disclosed NV approach of supportive documentation 
for the nurses’ rights to not fear retribution (ANA, NursingWorld, #4) and teaching a culture of 
safety approach to what went wrong instead of who caused the problem (Barnsteiner, 2011). The 
ANA’s Position Statement of Just Culture (2010) attempts to assist the nursing world to capture 
an alternative to a punitive system but may stop short by focusing on monitoring individual 
behavior within the system, which continues to question if the behavior of the nurse at the 
bedside is still the focus instead of looking at the systemic vulnerabilities as a whole (Woods & 
Cook, 2002). An alternative just culture approach would be a NV approach by normalizing 
incidents so they are acceptable part of organizational development (Dekker, 2008) and moving 
to a forward-looking accountability (Sharpe, 2004). 
 
The manager role of support gave way to the NV approach by supportive statements of the ‘we’ 
concept and moving forward (Sharpe, 2004) to fix the problem together. The difficulty the NM’s 
faced was the twisting of incident stories depending on who was telling the story but the NM 
attempted to investigate further before reacting and shared learning from error in a general way 
to the rest of his/her staff. Four of the nurses interviewed felt supported by their NM, which is a 
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key for the continuum of learning from errors made, and they were more likely to continue to 
report incidents.  
 
Overall, the internal, personal definition of what a nurses believe is human error conciliates what 
is reported to the NM or placed into the incident reporting tool. The overarching nursing 
organizational documents and nursing state laws add boundaries and constraints of how an 
incident will be manage within the healthcare system. Since the healthcare system is in its 
adolescent years of initiating and publishing safety initiatives, changes may evolve over time to 
assist the nursing ethos standards that errors are normal everyday occurrences and fallibility 
requires ownership. This ownership will increase accountability to improve the systemic 
vulnerabilities and a less focus on individuals within the system. 
 
Limitations to the study were that a single institution was used for data collecting. The sample 
size was limited to eight participants. The participants could have held back information since 
the researcher and the participants worked at the same institution. Therefore, the results cannot 
be generalized. Even though, this study can help make visible some important issues that may 
need to  be considered when healthcare systems deal with human error.  
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Appendix A-  
Interview Questions  
Questions for Nurse Managers 
 
Demographic Information 
 
1. Please tell me your name, age, gender and how long you have been a registered nurse and 
how long you have been a nurse manager. 
 
Relevance: To establish background and demographic information 
 
Human Error 
 
1. What is your definition of ‘human error’? 
 
Relevance: To gain a basic understanding of what the nurse manager believes is human error. 
 
2. How did you come to know this definition? 
 
Relevance: This will give insight to what types of social concepts or healthcare organizations 
influences guide the nurse manager’s belief about human error.  
 
3. How does your organization approach ‘human error’? 
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Relevance: This will give information as the nurse manager’s perception of the organizational 
principles regarding human error. 
 
4. How do other nurse managers you know define human error? 
 
Relevance: This will give information as to any type of knowledge sharing about  human error or 
if  each nurse manager follow her own type of understanding of human error. 
 
5. How do they deal with human error? 
 
Relevance: This will give information as to understand what each nurse manager perceives about 
peer managers dealings with human error. 
 
Incident Reporting 
 
1. How many incidents (approximately) has your staff reported on your units in the last 
month? And was it placed in the incident reporting tool? 
 
Relevance: To establish the understanding that the nurse may report an incident to the nurse 
manager but not place it in the incident reporting system. 
 
a. What type of incident was reported to you? 
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Relevance:  To understand if the nurse managers are aware of incidents and take care of it 
themselves without placing them in as an incident report. 
 
b. Do you feel there is under reporting (over reporting) of incidents in your unit? 
c. Share with me your reasons as to why you feel there is underreporting (or over 
reporting) 
 
Relevance: This will give information of the nurse manager’s perception of overall incident 
reporting 
 
 
2. How do you typically respond to an incident report?  
 
Relevance: This will give information of how the nurse manager gathers information of an 
incident report. 
 
3. What would be an example of a situation where an incident was reported? 
a. When it was not reported? Why do you think it was not reported? 
 
Relevance: This will give information of decisions made to report or not to report and incident 
and why. 
 
4. Can you tell me about the time when a nurse discussed an error with you?  
a. How did you handle the situation?  
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b. Is there a time you would have handled it differently? And how so? 
 
Relevance: This will give information of what type of approach the nurse manager takes as she 
follows through a incident with a nurse. 
 
 
5. Can you think of anything that would make reporting more likely? 
 
Relevance: This presents information from a nurse manager’s view of  improvements in the 
current system. 
 
Questions for Registered Nurses 
 
Demographic Information 
 
1. Please tell me your name, age, gender and how long you have been a registered nurse 
and how long you have been a nurse manager. 
 
Relevance: To establish background and demographic information 
 
 
Human Error 
 
1. What is your definition of ‘human error’? 
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Relevance: To gain a basic understanding of what the nurse believes is human error. 
 
2. How did you come to know this definition? 
 
      Relevance: This will give insight to what types of social concepts or healthcare  
      organizations influences guide the nurse’s belief about human error.  
 
3. How does your organization approach human error? 
 
Relevance: This will give information as the nurse’s perception of the organizational principles 
regarding human error. 
 
4. How do other nurses you know define human error? 
 
Relevance: This will give information as to any type of knowledge sharing about  human error or 
if  each nurse follow her own type of understanding of human error. 
 
5. How do they deal with human error? 
 
Relevance: This will give information as to understand what each nurse perceives about peers 
coping with human error. 
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Incident Reporting 
 
6. What types of incidents are reported to your nurse manager?  And are the incidents placed 
into the incident reporting tool? 
 
Relevance: This will give information in regards to the nurses understanding as to the various 
types of incidents she would report to her nurse manager and if she believes in needs to be placed 
into the incident reporting tool. 
 
a. Do you think there are errors that do not get reported? And why? 
 
Relevance: This will give information as to the nurse’s perception of the cause of lack of reporting 
of an incident. 
 
7. How do you typically decide to write an incident report?  
 
Relevance; This will give information as to the understanding of the nurses view to place an 
incident report or not too. 
 
8. Can you give me an example of a situation where an incident was reported and what 
happened as a result of reporting the incident? 
 
a. When it was not reported? 
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Relevance: This will give information to what the nurse decides to report and what happens as a 
result and when an incident is not reported and the result? 
 
9. Can you tell me about the time when you discussed an error with a peer?  
 
Relevance: This will give information as the whether nurses share errors made  with their peers 
and establish the rationale for sharing or not sharing with a peer. 
 
 
a. Was this an error you did not report  but you wanted too? Can you elaborate? 
 
 
b. What was your main reason for not reporting the incident? 
 
Relevance: This will give information of understanding as to the rationale for not reporting the 
incident. 
 
 
10. Would you more likely self report  an incident or report a peer? And why? 
 
Relevance: This will give information of the of the rationale for self reporting or peer reporting 
and which one is more often reported over the other. 
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Appendix C 
RESEARCH CONSENT FORM 
 
You are being asked to participate as a subject in the research project titled: How the approach to 
human error by the healthcare guides the nurses and/or nurse manager’s view of incident reports?  
 
Study Location: The University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston  
 
Study Researcher: Amanda B. Kuenstler 
 
Study Sponsor: Lund University, Lund, Sweden.  
 
Please take the time to read the following information carefully.  
 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand how nurses and nurse managers in a healthcare setting 
understand human error and how their understanding impacts incident reporting and the 
manager’s response to the incident reports. The primary research question is: How does the 
approach to human error in the healthcare system guide the nurse and/or nurse manager’s view of 
incident reporting? There are no right or wrong answers. This study is to understand how humans 
think about errors made in a healthcare setting and how this plays a role in how we participate in 
writing and responding to incident reports.  
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 This study is being conducted as part of a Masters of Science project on human factors and system 
safety.  
 
You are being asked to participate because you are either a registered nurse who has worked in a 
hospital with one or more years experience or a nurse manager in a hospital setting, with four or 
more years of experience in the manager role.  
 
PROCEDURES RELATED ONLY TO THE RESEARCH 
 
You are consenting to participate in an interview using semi-structured questions related to 
human error and incident reporting which will take about 60 minutes of your time. With this 
consent, you will be audio recorded or if you wish not to be recorded, hand written notes will be 
taken. Confidentiality will be maintained by assigning numerical codes and unique pseudonyms 
to each participant.  All identify information will be removed from the transcripts and no one 
except the PI will have access to the participant codes. The codes will be kept in a locked file and 
destroyed at the completion of the study. All consents and research information will be 
maintained in a locked file cabinet in the researcher’s office for one year. A copy of the consent 
form will be given to the participant upon signing and agreeing to be a part of the study. If the 
participant would like a copy of the study after completion then a copy will be given to the 
participant. The whole project will be completed by December 2013.  
 
 
PROCEDURES NOT RELATED TO THIS RESEARCH (i.e., standard of care) 
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No procedures will be done that are not part of the research. 
 
 
RISKS OF PARTICIPATION 
 
Confidentiality will be maintained by assigning numerical codes and unique pseudonyms to each 
participant.  All identifying information will be removed from the transcripts and no one except 
the PI will have access to the participant codes. The codes will be kept in a locked file and 
destroyed at the completion of the study. All consents and research information will be 
maintained in a locked file cabinet in the researcher’s office for one year. The potential risk is loss 
of confidentiality if the participant self-discloses that they are in the study. 
 
 
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS PARTICIPATING AND THE DURATION OF YOUR 
PARTICIPATION 
 
The anticipated number of subjects involved in the study will be five registered nurses and three 
nurse managers, all participants are from UTMB. The length of time for your participation is a 
one-time 60-minute interview. In order to verify or clarify portions of the interview, the PI may 
contact the participant for a third interview.  
 
BENEFITS TO THE SUBJECT 
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You will not benefit individually from your participation in the research project but the profession 
or patients could benefit from the study results.  
 
 
OTHER CHOICES (ALTERNATIVE TREATMENT) 
 
The alternative is to not participate in the research study. 
 
 
SAFE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE STUDY 
 
As a participant in this study, you may decide to withdraw from the study at any given time. If you 
decide to withdraw all interview documents/audio tape will be destroyed. There are no 
consequences from withdrawing from the study. 
 
 
REIMBURSEMENT FOR EXPENSES 
 
There will be no reimbursement for participation in this study and participants will be offered no 
incentives or gifts as a result of participating in the research study. 
 
 
COSTS OF PARTICIPATION 
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There will be no cost for participating in the study.  
 
 
If you sign this form, you are giving us permission to collect, use and share your interview 
information.  You do not need to sign this form.  If you decide not to sign this form, you cannot 
be in the research study.  We cannot do the research if we cannot collect, use and share your 
interview.  Whether or not you agree to the research project or give us permission to collect, use 
or share your interview is strictly voluntary. The interviews are being done only because you are 
in this study. The results of this study may be published in scientific journals without identifying 
you by name.   
  
If you change your mind later and do not want us to collect or share your interview, you need to 
contact the researcher listed on this consent form by telephone.  You need to say that you have 
changed your mind and do not want the researcher to collect and share your interview.  
 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION  
  
1. If you have any questions, concerns or complaints before, during or after the research 
study, you should immediately contact Amanda Kuenstler at 409-772-5252 office or 
409-771-1926 cell   
 
2. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you have been told that you 
may refuse to participate or stop your participation in this project at any time without 
penalty or loss of benefits and without jeopardizing your medical care at UTMB.  If you 
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decide to stop your participation in this project and revoke your authorization for the use 
and disclosure of your information, the PI may continue to use and disclose your study 
information in some instances.  This would include any information that was used or 
disclosed prior to your decision to stop participation and needed in order to maintain the 
integrity of the research study.  If there are significant new findings or we get any 
information that might change your mind about participating, we will give you the 
information and allow you to reconsider whether or not to continue.   
 
3. If you have any complaints, concerns, input or questions regarding your rights as a subject 
participating in this research study or you would like more information, you may contact 
the Institutional Review Board Office, at (409) 266-9475. 
 
The purpose of this research study, procedures to be followed, risks and benefits have been 
explained to you.  You have been allowed to ask questions and your questions have been answered 
to your satisfaction.  You have been told who to contact if you have additional questions.  You have 
read this consent form and voluntarily agree to participate as a subject in this study.  You are free to 
withdraw your consent at any time.  You may withdraw your consent by notifying Amanda 
Kuenstler at 409-771-1926.   You will be given a copy of the consent form you have signed. 
 
Informed consent is required of all persons in this project.  Whether or not you provide a signed 
informed consent for this research study will have no effect on your current or future relationship 
with UTMB.        
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Signature of Subject 
 
Date 
 
____________________________________ 
  
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent  
 
        
   
 
Date 
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